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Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan*
Welsh S. White**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Caplan yearns for the good old days "when the police enjoyed greater public confidence" and, in accordance with the
tactics recommended in the police manuals, it was acceptable "for
an investigator to talk sharply to the suspect or glare at him or sit
too closely or withhold cigarettes, or, from the opposite vantage, to
pretend to be a sympathetic friend or a concerned coreligionist."'
Thus, Professor Caplan attacks the Miranda decision 2 on the
ground that "by introducing novel conceptions of the proper relationship between the suspect and authority," Miranda operates to
subvert the principal function of the criminal process, the reliable
identification of offenders.3 Professor Caplan concludes that Miranda should be overruled.4
* This Article responds to Professor Gerald Caplan's Article entitled, Questioning
Miranda, which appeared at 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985).
** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I would like to thank Professor Steven
Schulhofer of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article and Alan Blanco for his valuable research assistance.
1. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAzw. L. REv. 1417, 1424 (1985).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1419.
4. Other recent commentators also have argued that Mirandashould be overruled. See
Frey, Modern Police InterrogationLaw: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV. 731
(1981); Gangi, The Inbau-KamisarDebate: Time for Round 2?., 12 W. ST. U.L. REv. 117
(1984); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859
(1979). Until now, however, the Burger Court has indicated that while it is willing to carve
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Although Professor Caplan presents his argument lucidly and
forcefully, the doctrinal basis for his position is not entirely clear.
He objects to Miranda's holding and analysis but does not specify
whether his objections primarily center on the Court's conclusion
that the fifth amendment privilege applies to police questioning at
the station house or to the Court's determination that the Miranda
warnings are necessary to protect that privilege. 5 Professor Caplan
does criticize the specific warnings required and intimates that the
much maligned voluntariness test provides a preferable way to
control police interrogation.' After examining the empirical data
relating to Miranda's operation and finding that Miranda's adverse effect on law enforcement is much greater than generally has
been recognized, he concludes that the rule established in Miranda
is not an appropriate compromise between the competing interests
of protecting individual rights and promoting the interests of law
enforcement.
This Article deals briefly with Professor Caplan's principal arguments. Part II discusses the constitutional basis for the Miranda
decision. Part III examines the viability of returning to the voluntariness test. Part IV addresses the question whether, in light of
the empirical data on Miranda's practical effect, the decision represents an appropriate compromise between the competing considerations of protecting individual rights and promoting the interests
of law enforcement.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR Miranda
Miranda's holding that the fifth amendment privilege applies
to in-custody interrogation was innovative, but, as Justice White
stated in his Miranda dissent, the novel conclusion does not in itself prove that the Court was "wrong or unwise in its ... reinterout new exceptions to Miranda, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (establishing "public safety" exception to Miranda), it is not inclined to "disparage" or "overrule" the decision "at this late date." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
5. In this respect Professor Caplan is similar to other critics of Miranda. For example,
Attorney General Edwin Meese complained that Miranda was "a wrong decision." Nevertheless, Meese went on to say, "I think that if a person doesn't want to answer, that's their
right, but you have had, time after time you've had all these ridiculous situations in which
the police are precluded from asking the one person who knows the most about the crime
what happened." Mr. Meese and Miranda, Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 1985, at A18, col. 1. By
admitting that the defendant has a right to remain silent, the Attorney General implicitly
suggested that he does not object to Miranda'sholding that the fifth amendment privilege
applies at the police station.
6. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1432-35.
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pretation of the Fifth Amendment." 7 Indeed, given the well-established rule that the fifth amendment privilege applies to grand jury
questioning8 as well as to legislative investigations9 and civil proceedings,10 holding that the privilege does not apply also to police
questioning at the station house would seem anomalous. One possible basis for distinguishing the cases exists. Because, unlike the
grand jury, a police officer who questions a suspect does not have
the legal authority to compel an answer, there is no legal obligation
to which the privilege can attach. As Professor Yale Kamisar has
pointed out, however, this difference is not a tenable basis for distinction as long as the police are dealing with "suspects who are
likely to assume or be led to believe that there are legal (or extralegal) sanctions for contumacy."11
The Miranda majority based its conclusion that suspects subjected to police interrogation would believe that there were legal or
extralegal sanctions for a failure to answer not only on exposure to
prior confession cases decided under the voluntariness test but
also, and perhaps more importantly, on an examination of the interrogation tactics recommended in police manuals.12 As Professor
Caplan recognizes, these tactics were designed to place the suspect
at a disadvantage.13 The manuals recommended that the police
seek to obtain confessions through the use of trickery and emotional appeals. Moreover, one of the manuals quoted by the Court
emphasized that, in appropriate cases, the police must establish an
atmosphere of intimidation:
The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where the sheer
weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals

and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He
should interrograte for a spell of several hours pausing only for the subject's

necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a charge of duress that
can be technically substantiated."'
7. 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
8. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
9. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S.
190 (1955).
10. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
11. Y. K nsm, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 46 (1980) (emphasis in original).

12. 384 U.S. at 448-55.
13. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1423-25.
14. 384 U.S. at 451 (quoting C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INV STIGATION 112
(1956)).
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Professor Caplan does not contend that the tactics described
in the police manuals were not employed by the police. 15 On the
contrary, he recognizes that the most influential interrogation
manual actually had the effect of curbing abuses that had existed
previously. 16 If the practices described in the manuals do represent
the norm, then the pressure on the suspect to answer questions is
certainly no less than the pressure exerted on a witness facing the
grand jury or a legislative committee.
In fact, as Professor Kamisar has noted, even commentators
who generally have opposed expanding the fifth amendment privilege argue in favor of applying it to police station questioning. 7
For example, prior to Miranda, Professor John McNaughton
presented the following analysis of the underlying fifth amendment
policies:
The significant purposes of the privilege ...

are two: (1) The first is to re-

move the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances where compulsion
might lead to inhumanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive tactics by
a zealous questioner. (2) The second is to comply with the prevailing ethic
that the individual is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between government and individual require that the individual not be bothered for less
than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponents to defeat himself.
...Both policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of those
which I reject, apply with full force to insure that police in informal interrogations not have the right to compel self-incriminatory answers. Whether the
result is reached by pointing out the elementary fact that police have not
been given the authority to compel disclosures of any kind or whether the
result is put on the ground that the person questioned is "privileged" not to
answer makes little difference. Answers should not be compelled by police
18

Professor Caplan's principal argument seems to be that even if
the fifth amendment privilege applies at the station house, the Miranda warnings are not necessary to safeguard this privilege. Although he particularly objects to the warning concerning the right
15. Bernard Weisberg, the first lawyer to emphasize the police manuals, argued Esco-

bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), for the ACLU as amicus curiae. "In his Escobedo brief,
Weisberg maintained that since police interrogation of arrested persons is characteristically
conducted in privacy and without a record being made, 'the best sources' for understanding
police questioning 'are the published manuals."' Y. KAMisAR, supra note 11, at 109. For
further discussion of the manuals, see id. at 1-8, 109-10.
16. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1432-33.
17. Y. KAvusAR, supra note 11, at 46-50.
18. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:Its ConstitutionalAffectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 223, 237 (C.Sowle ed. 1962), quoted in Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 46-47.
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to have an attorney present during police interrogation,1 9 he also
objects to the basic requirement that the police warn the suspect
of his right to remain silent. In addressing the latter warning, Professor Caplan makes essentially two points. First, he contends that
the warning encourages the suspect to withhold information, and
in related contexts, such as one in which a professor suspects a
student of plagiarism, we do not require this encouragement. Professor Caplan says, "Of course, a man suspected of murder faces a
greater penalty than a student risking expulsion, but does this factor support an argument for or against a warning of a right to remain silent?"2 0 The simple answer to this question is that, under
our constitutional system, the person who is charged with a criminal offense is entitled to more protection than a person who is accused of plagiarism. In particular, the fifth amendment privilege
potentially applies to the murder suspect but not to the plagiarism
suspect. This does not necessarily mean that the person suspected
of murder is entitled to a warning before police questioning, but
the fifth amendment's applicability does distinguish the murder
suspect's case from the other ones discussed by Professor Caplan.
Professor Caplan concedes that a warning of the right to remain silent has value because "[p]roof that the suspect knows his
rights is relevant to a determination that his statements were not
coerced.' 1 Presumably, Professor Caplan would also agree that if
the suspect is not aware of his right to remain silent, then at least
from the suspect's perspective, his answers would be compelled because he might believe that his only alternative was to answer the
questions asked by the police. 22 But Professor Caplan is concerned
about the suspect who knows his rights. He concludes that "[i]n
19.

Caplan, supra note 1, at 1438-41, 1463-64. Strictly speaking, this warning is not

constitutionally required by Miranda.Miranda holds only that the warnings described in
that opinion are required in the absence of "other procedures which are at least as effective
in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 384 U.S. at 467. Thus, a system in which a neutral party warned criminal suspects of their right to remain silent and then observed police interrogations to insure
that the suspects had a continuous opportunity to exercise that right might be an adequate
substitute for the Miranda warnings.
20. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1452.
21. Id. at 1454.
22. But cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that an individual's lack of knowledge of his right to refuse a police request to search does not necessarily
render a consent search involuntary). In Schneckloth Justice Stewart distinguished the situation presented in Miranda, stating, "[T]he [Miranda] Court found that the techniques of

police questioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce an inherently coercive
situation." Id. at 247.
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the fifth amendment context,. . . the automatic suppression of an
incriminating statement solely because of a failure to advise a sus'23
pect who in fact knows his rights seems excessive.
Professor Caplan's position seems to make sense on its face. If
the defendant already is cognizant of his right to remain silent,
why should the police be required to inform him of that right? Of
course, problems of proof will be lessened if the police do inform
the defendant. As the Court said, assessing the defendant's knowledge on the basis of "his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. ' 24 Nevertheless, some cases certainly exist in
which the government can prove the suspect's knowledge of his
right to remain silent by convincing evidence. In these cases, why
should the suspect be entitled to a warning?
Miranda'sanswer is that the warning is "an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere."2' 5 Even a suspect who has a complete understanding of
his rights is likely to be coerced into making a statement because
of the pressure created by police questioning. From one perspective, this position seems very surprising. Suppose the police have a
law professor at the police station. They ask him one question after failing to warn him of his constitutional rights. Can it be said
that the coercive atmosphere of the police station will overbear the
professor's will to such an extent that he will feel compelled to answer the officer's question?
Maybe not in every case, but certainly in some cases the combination of custody and interrogation will lead the professor to feel
that his only alternative is to answer the officer's question. Even if
the professor is aware of his right to remain silent, he does not
necessarily know that the officer is prepared to honor that right.
The warnings may be necessary to give him that assurance. Moreover, in a highly stressful situation such as custodial interrogation,
an individual's abstract knowledge of his rights may be less important than his ability to cope with the pressure of the situation."
Empirical evidence suggests that even in noncoercive settings, individuals who are aware of their rights may feel compelled to re23.

Caplan, supra note 1, at 1455.
24. 384 U.S. at 469.
25. Id. at 468.
26. See Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAIv. L.
42 (1968).

REv.
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spond to police questioning.2 7
Of course, there still may be some cases in which the warnings
are not necessary to protect the professor's fifth amendment privilege. But how can those cases be identified in advance? Because
there is a legitimate basis for concluding that custodial interrogation may overbear the will of even a knowledgeable individual, Miranda should not be criticized for its failure to distinguish between
suspects who are more or less knowledgeable about their rights. s
Moreover, from an historical perspective, this discussion may
seem somewhat unnecessary. In the years prior to Miranda, the
Court had not been exposed to any situation in which a knowledgeable individual confessed after being asked a single question.
As Professor Caplan's account of the cases decided under the voluntariness standard 29 indicates, the prior cases almost invariably
concerned situations in which police questioned relatively unsophisticated suspects for prolonged periods."0 Moreover, the tactics
described in the police manuals that were presented to the Miranda Court reinforced the claim that the typical police interrogation was calculated to overcome an individual's will to resist.
Against this background, Miranda'sconclusion that warnings were
necessary to prevent compulsion seems justified.
In addition, Miranda was designed to alleviate the litigation
problems involved in determining whether a particular confession
was compelled. Professor Caplan praises the voluntariness test in
part because "its inquiry was a search for existential fact, an attempt to capture what actually happened at the police station." '
But long before Miranda, it was widely recognized that, in most
cases, the adversary process was not equipped to give anything
close to an accurate picture of what happened at the police sta27. See Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project:Interrogationof Draft
Protesters,77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).
28. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, it seems fruitless to quibble over whether
the warnings should be given to someone who already is aware of his rights. If the suspect
already knows his rights, what is the harm in giving him the warnings?
29. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1428-43.
30. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (defendant, an "impoverished Negro with a third or fourth grade education," was interrogated for about an hour
once or twice each day for 16 continuous days until he confessed); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961) (defendant with an IQ of 64 and a mental age of 9 /2 years was questioned repeatedly but intermittently for over four days before he confessed); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant, who had a ninth grade education and a history of
emotional instability, was interrogated over an eight hour period extending into the early
hours of the morning).
31. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1434.
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tion. s2 The problem was not simply one of resolving the "swearing
contest" in which the police officers and the defendant gave differing versions of the interrogation. 3 As Professor Kamisar's account
of the Williams3 4 litigation vividly demonstrates, even if the officers gave an accurate account of the facts, including the length of
questioning, the number of officers involved, and a description of
any tricks that were used, this account would still not begin to describe the interrogation process experienced by the suspect.35 The
police manuals indicate that interrogation techniques are sophisticated. The police tactics are designed to have subtle effects that
may not easily be described. Thus, a verbal account of what the
police said or did to a suspect does not reflect the atmosphere created in the interrogation room.
The few existing tapes of interrogations confirm this. For example, the police recorded their six hour interrogation of John
Biron in 1962.8 Six hours of interrogation may not sound excessive, and the police allowed the suspect to rest and did not
threaten or abuse him at any time. An accurate account of the police conduct in that case might not suggest that the defendant was
exposed to coercive tactics. But as Professor Kamisar has observed, when you listen to the police on the tape, "their urging,
beseeching, wheedling, nagging Biron to confess is so repetitious
and so unrelenting that two hours of listening is about all most
37
students can stand.
The Miranda rule, therefore, was necessary in part because
the litigation process was incapable of "captur[ing] what actually
happened at the police station."38 Based on this perception of the
realities of police interrogation, the Court believed that the warnings generally would be necessary to dissipate the coercive atmosphere at the station house. Moreover, based on the Court's awareness of the inherent limitations of the litigation process, it also
32. See generally Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 135; Amsterdam, The Supreme Court
and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 785, 806 (1970); Pound,
Legal Interrogationof Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCL 1014, 1017 (1934).

33. For an incisive discussion of the implications of this "swearing contest," see Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 806-08. See also Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 865, 870-71 (1981).
34. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
35. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 113-37.
36. See State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963), noted in 48 MINN. L.
REv. 160 (1963). See generally Y. KAmisAR, supra note 11, at 98-99 & n.3.
37. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 98-99.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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believed that the warnings were appropriate because, in their absence, the objective of determining whether a particular confession
was coerced would be elusive at best.3 9 Finally, the Court implicitly
believed that, by providing the defendant an opportunity to exercise his rights, the warnings largely would eliminate the need for
future litigation relating to the circumstances of the interrogation
process.4 0
Thus, Miranda rests on a legitimate constitutional basis. The
Miranda rule represents an effort to apply the fifth amendment
privilege to a vital stage of the adversary process. Moreover, the
Court was justified in believing that the Miranda rule would alleviate some of the principal problems associated with the Court's earlier efforts to control police interrogation at the police station.
III.

THE VOLUNTARINESS TEST

In retrospect, it is easy to criticize Miranda, but it is probably
easier to criticize Miranda for not going far enough than for going
too far. As several commentators have pointed out, 1 requiring the
police to warn suspects of their rights creates an inherent conflict
of interest.' 2 Because the police are expected to solve crimes, one
of their principal objectives is to persuade the suspect to talk. If
the police are responsible for solving crimes, is it fair to make them
also the guardian of the suspect's constitutional rights by requiring
them to give warnings that are designed to persuade the suspect
not to talk? 43 As Professor Caplan explains, "The enduring consequence of the Court's decision to make the police couriers of fifth
39. 384 U.S. at 445.
40. See id. at 457.
41. See generally Y. KAmiSAR, supra note 11, at 85.
42. Professor Kamisar has noted that an analogous point was made during the oral
argument before the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985):
[W]hen one Justice suggested that it would not be unduly burdensome for the police to
tell a suspect that they had treated him improperly at an earlier session and that therefore they would not offer the incriminating statement obtained at the earlier session as
evidence against him, the Attorney General of Oregon retorted that such a requirement
"might do a great deal of mischief because it confuses the role of the police officer with
that of the criminal defense lawyer."
Y. Kamisar, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference 8
(Sept. 13, 1985) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). In commenting on this argument,
Professor Kamisar asks, "Doesn't the Miranda case itself 'confuse the role of the police
officer with that of the criminal defense lawyer'?" Id.
43. As one advocate put it: "[I]s
it the duty of the police to persuade the suspect to
talk or persuade him not to talk? They cannot be expected to do both." Brief of Edward L.
Barrett, Jr., as amnicus curiae at 9, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal,
Rptr. 169 (on rehearing), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
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amendment rights was to stifle the exercise of those rights." 4 "
In addition, Miranda has not substantially alleviated the litigation problems that existed in administering the voluntariness
test. Under that test, courts had to determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary. Under Miranda,if it appears that
a defendant was given Miranda warnings and was subsequently
subjected to custodial interrogation, a court must determine
whether the defendant waived his constitutional rights. Both the
voluntariness and waiver issues generate the same "swearing contest" between the suspect and the police and ironically, in resolving the waiver issue, many lower courts have applied a totality of
circumstances test that is similar to the totality of circumstances
test utilized to determine whether a confession is voluntary. 5
These problems suggest a basic flaw in Miranda. The Court's
determination that a suspect's decision to incriminate himself cannot be truly voluntary is fundamentally inconsistent with its conclusion that the same suspect's choice to waive his constitutional
rights can be voluntary. This inconsistency suggests either that
Miranda went too far or not far enough. 46 The compromise

reached in Miranda may not be the best means of accommodating
the conflicting interests involved."
So Miranda does have problems. But if the decision is to be
overruled, some alternative means of protecting the constitutional
rights of individuals who are subjected to police interrogation at
the station house should be offered. Professor Caplan declines to
propose alternatives. Thus, the effect of his proposal is that the
Court overrule Miranda and return to the voluntariness test.
Moreover, he supports this position by arguing that the voluntariness test is superior to Mirandabecause it strikes a more appropriate balance between the needs of law enforcement and the protec44. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1461.
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975). The Starkes
court stated:
[I]n determining the voluntariness of the waiver, all attending factors ... must be
considered. . . [including the] "duration, and the methods of interrogation; the conditions of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward the defendant, the defendant's physical and psychological state and all other conditions present which may
serve to drain ones [sic] powers of resistance . .. .
Id. at 184-85, 335 A.2d at 701 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 134, 317 A.2d
241, 244 (1974)).
46. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROcEuURE 286 (1985).
47. For suggestions of other possible approaches to accommodating the conflicting in-

terests, see Y.

KAMISAR,

supra note 11, at 77-94; Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 884 n.84.
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tion of the suspect's constitutional rights.4 8 In addition, he
intimates that a return to the voluntariness test may be especially
appropriate now because the increasing professionalization of the
police in the last two decades has made interrogators less inclined
to use coercive tactics in questioning suspects.49
Professor Caplan's defense of the voluntariness test echoes, in
part, the views of the dissenting Justices in Miranda. Each of the
three dissenting opinions5" suggests that the approach of examining the totality of circumstances in each case can provide "workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial
manner." 51 In his classic "dissent" from these dissents, Professor
Kamisar effectively demolished the dissenters' arguments.5 2 His
examination of pre-Mirandacases decided under the voluntariness
standard, 53 especially the Davis case in which the lower courts held
the defendant's confession voluntary despite the fact that no one
but the police had seen or spoken to the suspect during the sixteen
days of detention and interrogation that preceded his confessions; 54 his selection of quotes from authorities relied on by the
dissent 5 (including one of the dissenter's own statements) characterizing the voluntariness standard as uncertain, 56 "unpredictable," 57 and "provid[ing] little guidance"5' 8 for the police or the
courts; and his pointed statistics exposing the small proportion of
confession cases actually reviewed by the Court5 9 all "expose[d]
the central premise of the dissenters' argument as altogether unconvincing if not mildly ridiculous. "60
Two decades have not altered the soundness of Kamisar's
analysis. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer has noted, the voluntariness "standard remains the principal basis for adjudication in va48. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1473-76.
49. Id.
50. See 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at
526 (White, J., dissenting).
51. E.g., id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. See Kamisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents, in Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11,
at 41-76.

53. Id. at 73-74.
54. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 745 (1966).
55. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 71-73.
56. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogationand the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 72 (1966), quoted
with approval in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 507 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 75.
60. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 869.
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rious confessions situations not governed by Miranda."61 Even in
quite recent times, lower courts have ruled confessions admissible
under the voluntariness standard despite the presence of factors
that seem to be extraordinarily coercive. Mincey v. Arizona 2 provides one striking example. In Mincey the defendant had been seriously wounded by the police a few hours prior to his interrogation and was "barely conscious" and in the intensive care unit of a
hospital at the time he was questioned. Lying on his back on a
hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and a breathing apparatus, and unable to speak, the defendant clearly and repeatedly
expressed his wish not be questioned, at one point writing on a
piece of paper, "This is all I can say without a lawyer." 3 Nevertheless, the detective continued to question him and to receive written
answers. The trial court found "with unmistakable clarity" that
the defendant's statements were "voluntary" and thus, although
obtained in violation of Miranda, were admissible for impeachment purposes6 The state supreme court unanimously affirmed."
The United States Supreme Court, with only Justice Rehnquist
dissenting,6 6 reversed the lower court's ruling. The Supreme Court
has not reviewed, however, other, equally questionable lower court
rulings that confessions were admissible under the voluntariness
standard. 7
61. Id. at 873.
62. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
63. Id. at 399.
64. Id. at 397 n.12.
65. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977).
66. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist disputed the Court's reading of the record, emphasizing that greater weight should have been given to testimony by the interrogating
detective and a nurse indicating "that neither mental or physical force nor abuse was used
on [the defendant]." 384 U.S. at 409. The dissents approach suggests a further problem in
administering the voluntariness test. Once the trial court has determined that a confession
is voluntary, a reviewing court that is inclined to uphold the ruling may interpret the record
ingeniously in a way that will sustain the trial court's ruling.
67. See, e.g., Almon v. Jernigan, 715 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1684 (1984) (defendant was arrested by victim's son, a sheriff's deputy, forced to lie
down in a road, kicked in the side, and shot in the hand; confession elicited the following
day by a different officer held voluntary notwithstanding defendant's fear that he would be
beaten by sheriff's department personnel if he did not confess); Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d
831 (Fla. 1977) (confession held voluntary despite extreme psychological coercion including
fabrication of incriminating evidence, administration of a bogus polygraph examination that
defendant "failed," and representations that if defendant confessed, he would be charged
with second degree murder and face a seven to twenty year sentence, instead of first degree
murder, a capital crime); State v. Wilms, 449 So. 2d 442 (La. 1984) (arresting officer struck
defendant's pregnant wife in the stomach; interrogating officers withheld medical aid for
over eight hours until defendant confessed; confession held voluntary). A later Florida court
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Professor Caplan suggests that Mirandais not as necessary today because the more abusive forms of police interrogation practices no longer exist.18 He states that even "[a]t the time Miranda
was argued, the worst practices of the nineteen forties and fifties..
. were disappearing.""' I am not prepared to dispute this statement. A perusal of the cases, however, indicates that if the "worst
practices" have disappeared, some pretty bad ones are still taking
place. In a 1973 Connecticut murder case the police held an immature eighteen-year-old suspect incommunicado, allowed him a few
hours of sleep at most and no hot food, and interrogated him for
nearly twenty-six continuous hours in order to obtain his confession. 70 In another 1973 case a police officer admitted to striking the
defendant while interrogating him in the back seat of a police
car.7 1 In a 1984 Louisiana case unrebutted evidence showed that
one police officer inexcusably struck the defendant's pregnant wife
in the stomach and a second police officer prevented her from receiving medical attention for over eight hours until the defendant
72
confessed.
These examples, which are not in any way aberrational,7 3 do
considered Burch to represent "a startling recitation of lies, deceptions, threats and
promises of leniency." William v. State, 441 So. 2d 653, 656 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
review denied, 450 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1984).
68. Of course, this argument ignores the basic premise of Miranda. If custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, the warnings are needed to protect the suspect's fifth
amendment privilege whether or not the police engage in abusive practices. Professor
Kamisar has expressed this point eloquently:
It is the impact on the suspect of the interplaybetween police interrogation and police
custody-each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the
other-that, as the Miranda Court correctly discerned, makes "custodial police interrogation" so coercive. It is the combination of "custody" and "interrogation" that establishes the "interrogation environment" that is "at odds" with the privilege against selfincrimination and that calls for "adequate protective devices."
Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, The Man, and The Players, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1074, 1077
(1984) (emphasis in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-58); see also Y. KAmIsAR,
supra note 11, at 195-97.
69. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1458.
70. See State v. Reilly, No. 5285 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1974), vacated, 32 Conn.
Supp. 349, 355 A.2d 324 (Super. Ct. 1976). For a detailed account of the confession obtained
in the Reilly case, see J. BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN 39-130 (1976).
71. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 1977).
72. State v. Wilms, 449 So. 2d 442, 444-45 (La. 1984).
73. Examples include the use of physical brutality, e.g., Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (defendant was threatened with death, was choked, and had arm
twisted behind his back in order to force him to reveal location of kidnap victim); Hill v.
State, 91 Wis. 2d 315, 283 N.W.2d 585 (1978) (detective told defendant he was playing
games, pulled handcuffed defendant out of a chair into the hall, and tripped defendant in
the hall); the administration of truth serum or alcohol to induce confessions, e.g., State v.
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not suggest that the police lack professional qualifications. They do
indicate that some effective mechanism is needed to curb potential
abuses. The voluntariness test is not well equipped to achieve this
objective. Indeed, as Professor Schulhofer suggests, application of
the voluntariness test tends to exacerbate the problem by permitting and even encouraging an interrogation process that might extend for several hours.74 As Professor Schulhofer observes:
Unfortunately, after several hours of questioning, "slowly mounting fatigue
does... play its part" in.weakening the officer. His will-to comply with the
law-may be "overborne" by impatience, frustration, or the persistence of a
stubborn suspect who refuses to "come clean." It should not have been surprising that sincere, dedicated investigators, intent on solving brutal crimes,
occasionally lost their tempers. 5

Thus, even if the qualifications and training of our police have improved, the voluntariness test does not provide an adequate check
on abusive police practices.
Professor Caplan's research of the post-Miranda cases discloses that since Miranda very few lower courts have held that a
defendant's confession was involuntary. He interprets this data to
mean that Miranda has diminished the effectiveness of the voluntariness test. 76 This inference might be proper if an examination of
pre-Miranda cases showed that the voluntariness test was being
applied vigorously during that period, but Professor Caplan does
not claim that the voluntariness test has been rigorously applied at
any time. In fact, the existing data suggests that the reverse is
true.
Pennsylvania is probably a typical state in its approach to poMikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497 (Me. 1983) (59 year old defendant, naked except for his socks, was
held in custody in his camp, subjected to tag-team interrogation by numbers of officers, and
encouraged to consume large quantities of alcohol to induce him to "give loose talk"); State
v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 606 P.2d 1043 (1979) (defendant, a multiple drug abuser under the
influence of drugs, was subjected to isolated interrogation including mean cop/nice cop and
guilt assumption strategies, misled as to evidence against him, and persuaded to submit to a
sodium amytol (truth serum) interview); threats to jail wife and place children in foster
care, e.g., State v. Stotler, 282 S.E.2d 255 (W. Va. 1981); confinement under inhuman conditions, e.g., O'Tinger v. State, 342 So. 2d 1343 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (defendant was confined without shoes for six days in a dirty jail, his feet became sore and infected, and he
confessed when promised the return of his boots); State v. Howard, 617 S.W.2d 658 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1981) (defendant, dressed only in cutoff blue jean shorts, was confined in a four
by five or five by six foot cell, furnished with only a chair, for 14 hours and misled regarding
evidence against him after asking to speak with counsel).
74. See Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 872.
75. Id. (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959)).
76. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1464-67.
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lice induced confessions, perhaps more liberal than most.7 7 Yet, in
pre-Miranda cases the Pennsylvania appellate courts held that
confessions were involuntary only rarely,7 8 and then, only when the
uncontradicted facts disclosed extraordinarily abusive conduct by
law enforcement officials.79 Moreover, the Pennsylvania trial court
judges' performance in dealing with cases that were remanded for
a judicial determination on the voluntariness issue in light of Jackson v. Denno8 ° illustrates their attitude toward coerced confession
claims. Like Professor Caplan, I was an assistant prosecutor during
that era, and I was involved in litigating some of those cases.8 1
While I did not keep a personal account of our office's record, I
know that it was exceptionally good. In fact, I remember my supervisor telling me that out of the dozens of Jackson v. Denno cases
litigated by our office, he could think of only one in which the
lower court ruled in the defendant's favor.
If the Pennsylvania courts' application of the pre-Miranda
voluntariness test was typical, the ineffectiveness of the voluntariness test observed by Professor Caplan is not a new phenomenon.
That test has never been an effective means of controlling the po77. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted Miranda quite liberally. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970) (the warning that defendant's statement could be used "for or against him" at trial held inadequate under Miranda); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575, 576 (1969) (defendant was
questioned within meaning of Miranda when mayor told him, "[Y]ou look kind of down in
the dumps; do you want to talk? ... [If you want to talk, talk"). Drawing upon the Supreme Court's McNabb-Mallory rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that unnecessary delay in bringing an arrested suspect before a magistrate for preliminary arraignment
will result in the exclusion of any confession obtained between arrest and arraignment. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977).
78. A Lexis search indicates that during the five year period from June, 1960, to May,
1966, the Pennsylvania appellate courts did not hold a single confession to be involuntary.
One confession held to be voluntary by the Pennsylvania Superior Court during the search
period was later ruled involuntary by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth
ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A.2d 628 (1966).
79. In Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A.2d 628 (1966), an
assistant district attorney interrogated the defendant four hours after he had undergone
major surgery for a bullet wound. Hospital records before and after the confession indicated
that the defendant was incoherent and semiconscious. At the time of the confession, the
defendant was restrained in his bed with six tubes emanating from his body. The Commonwealth's medical expert testified at trial that under the totality of circumstances test, there
was a reasonable doubt whether the confession was voluntary.
80. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The Jackson Court held that requiring the same jury to adjudicate both the defendant's guilt and the voluntariness of the defendant's confession was
unconstitutional. The Court also held that cases in which this improper procedure was followed should be remanded to the state courts for a judge to pass upon the voluntariness of
each disputed confession.
81. I was an assistant district attorney in Philadelphia from 1966 to 1968.
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tential evils of incommunicado interrogation.8 2 Thus, if we are
committed to the idea of protecting the defendant's fifth amendment privilege during police interrogation, replacing Miranda with
the voluntariness test would be a major step backward, marking
the return to a test that provides not only too little guidance for
the police and lower courts but also historically little or no check
on coercive police questioning.
IV.

STRIKING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE

In arguing that Miranda fails to strike an appropriate balance
between government and individual interests, Professor Caplan
quotes extensively from Justice Jackson's opinion in Watts v. Indiana.83 After observing that police interrogation of suspects in the
absence of counsel "presents a real dilemma in a free society,"
Jackson posited a stark contrast between allowing the police to
question a suspect without his attorney present and allowing the
suspect to have counsel present during the custodial interrogation.8 4 Anticipating the views of the dissenters in Miranda, Jackson indicated that the choice is between police questioning that
may lead to effective law enforcement and requiring that the "police stand by helplessly while those suspected of murder prowl
about unmolested."8 5
Like Professor Caplan, both Justice Jackson and the Miranda
dissenters intimated that the fifth amendment privilege should not
be treated as an absolute but should be interpreted with a regard
for law enforcement interests. Thus, if providing additional safeguards for suspects at the police station imposed a substantial burden on law enforcement, this burden should be considered in determining the scope of the applicable constitutional protections. In
particular, if a new safeguard created the law enforcement dilemma envisioned by Justice Jackson, this would be a strong argument for refusing to require it.
Despite Justice Jackson's perception of the consequences involved, he nevertheless acknowledged that the issue of the suspect's right to have counsel present during police questioning was a
difficult one. He noted that, under any interpretation, our constitutional system "comes close" to requiring that a suspect be con82.
83.
84.
85.

See generally W. SCHAEFER,
338 U.S. 49 (1949).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61-62.

THE SUSPECT AND SocEry 10

(1967).
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victed only on the basis of "such evidence as he cannot conceal
from the authorities, who cannot compel him to testify in court
and also cannot question him before."8' 6 After presenting his view
of the extreme costs to law enforcement that this requirement
would impose, he concludes with the following famous passage:
Is it a necessary price to pay for the fairness which we know as "due process
of law"? And if not a necessary one, should it be demanded by this Court? I
do not know the ultimate answer to these questions; but, for the present, I
should not increase the handicap on society.8

Miranda does not, of course, answer the questions Justice
Jackson posed, but the post-Miranda experience suggests that the
questions should perhaps be posed in different terms. The empirical data on Miranda'simpact suggests that contrary to the dissenters' expectations, the Court's decision to provide suspects with the
Miranda protections has not substantially "increase[d] the handicap on society." 88 Surprisingly, the studies show that Miranda has
had relatively little effect on law enforcement. These results suggest perhaps that the dilemma Justice Jackson posited does not
really exist. Maybe criminal suspects can be afforded protections
that are fully consistent with the spirit of our constitutional system
without significantly impairing the interests of law enforcement.
Professor Caplan would disagree with this assessment. He asserts that the Miranda studies show that it is inaccurate to conclude that "Mirandahas had little effect on police efficiency."8 9 He
relies particularly on the Pittsburgh study in which the researchers
determined that the detective division, which investigated homicide, robbery, burglary, auto larceny, and forcible sex, obtained
confessions in 54.5 % of all cases before Miranda but only in 37.5 %
of all cases after Miranda-an overall decline of seventeen percentage points.90 A decline of seventeen percentage points in the
confession rate does appear to be significant, but in order to determine the effect of this decline on police efficiency, one would also
want to investigate the conviction rate. The authors of the Pittsburgh study in fact made this investigation. They concluded that
the conviction rate for major crimes in Allegheny County during
this period "remained steady. For the first six months after Miranda the conviction rate dropped slightly but it then bounced
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Caplan, supra note 1, at 1464.
Id.
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back in the first half in 1967."Il In fact, the authors' tables show
that during the first six months of 1967, the conviction rate was
higher than at any other time during 1964 to 1966.2 While the
93
conviction rate is not the only indication of police efficiency,
these figures certainly suggest that the decline of seventeen percentage points in the confession rate did not produce a dramatic
impact on law enforcement.
Professor Caplan asserts that the Pittsburgh study "best measures Miranda's impact on crime detection.

9

4

Apparently, Profes-

sor Caplan based this assertion on the fact that the Pittsburgh
study presented pre-Miranda and post-Miranda data obtained
from "a medium-sized city with a significant crime problem."95 In
fact, the Pittsburgh study is not the only one meeting these criteria. A much more extensive study, conducted by the Institute of
Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center,
examined the effect of Miranda on people arrested for felony and
serious misdemeanor cases in Washington, D.C.96 By questioning
defendants subjected to arrest procedures in the District of Columbia during 1965 and 1966, the Institute obtained figures showing
the frequency with which defendants asserted their rights before
and after Miranda.The study's overall conclusion is that little has
changed since Miranda was decided.9 7 The rate of statements reported to have been given to the police was "remarkably uniform"
at around forty percent in both the pre- and post-Miranda
periods."8
I have no basis for asserting that either of these studies is superior to the other. Of all the post-Miranda studies, however, the
91. Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 1, 19 (1967).
92. See id. at 19. The table shows that the conviction rate during the first six months
of 1967 was 68.7%. Prior to Miranda, the highest conviction rate over the period of the
study was 67.2% in 1965. During the six months prior to Miranda, the conviction rate was
66.8%.
93. The police clearance rate (measuring the percentage of cases in which the police
are satisfied they have found the perpetrator of the crime) might also be taken as an indica-

tor of police efficiency. The Pittsburgh study data indicate that when the figures for the 18
months preceding Miranda are compared with those for the 12 months succeeding Miranda,
it appears that the clearance rate in Allegheny County increased by 1.4%. See Seeburger &
Wettick, supra note 90, at 21.
94. Caplan, supra note 1, at 1464.
95. Id.
96. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Interrogationin Our Nation's Capitol:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1351-52, 1352 n.20, 1441.
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Pittsburgh study was the only one to find that Miranda effected a
significant decrease in the confession rate. 99 The authors of that
study even suggested that the confession rate decrease could be
attributed in part to sampling bias. The study focused on a detective branch composed of highly professional officers who may have
been particularly conscientious in complying with Miranda.10 0
Moreover, Professor Richard Seeburger, one of the study's authors,
recently commented that the study's "central finding was that law
enforcement's effectiveness was not significantly impaired as a result of Miranda."''° Professor Seeburger added that at the time of
99. The great weight of empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda's
impact on the police's ability to obtain confessions has not been significant. A study conducted by the Yale Law Review in New Haven, Connecticut concluded that "Mirandawarnings had little impact on suspects' behavior." Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563 (1967). That study, described by the Council of the American Law Institute as "probably the most comprehensive," A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 108 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE STUDY
DRAFT], based its conclusion on three observations: (1) observation of interrogations of both
warned and unwarned suspects indicated that police paradoxically were more successful in
obtaining confessions from warned suspects, 76 YALE L.J. at 1563; (2) individual evaluation
of each case indicated that warnings were a factor in reducing interrogation success in only 8
of 81 cases, id. at 1563; and (3) review of police records from 1960 to 1966 indicated a 10%
to 15% drop in the confession rate, id. at 1564. Figures from other metropolitan areas indicate even smaller changes in confession rates. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note
96, at 1414 Table E-1 (1967-68) (pre- and post-Miranda confession rate stable at about
40%); Witt, Non Coercive Interrogationand the Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325 (1973)
(interrogations conducted in "Seaside City," a pseudonymous subdivision of the Los Angeles
metropolitan area, were successful in 69% of pre-Miranda cases and 67% of post-Miranda
cases); Younger, Interrogationof Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 255, 255-60 (1966-67) (confession rate for a sample of Los Angeles
County felony cases increased from 40% to 50% after Miranda). Other studies, while not
focusing upon the confession rate before and after Miranda, strengthen the conclusion that
Miranda has had a minimal effect on law enforcement. See, e.g., Neubaner, Confessions in
PrairieCity: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 111 (1974) (1968
data for medium sized central Illinois city indicated that "police are fairly successful in
obtaining statements from suspects: over 45% of the felony defendants made a confession."); Robinson, Police and ProsecutorPracticesand Attitudes Relating to Interrogation
as Revealed by Pre- and Post-MirandaQuestionnaires:A Contruct of Police Capacity to
Comply, 1968 DUKE L.J. 425, 464-65 n.90 (police clearance rate unchanged after Miranda);
see also Reiss & Black, Interrogationand the Criminal Process,374 ANNALS 47 (Nov. 1967)
(concluding, based on post-Mirandastudy of field interrogation in high crime rate precincts
in Washington, D.C., Boston, and Chicago, that extension of Miranda into field settings
would have little effect); cf. Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search, 57 J. CRaM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 251, 263-64 (1966) (Detroit study scrutinizing effect of Escobedo
warning found confessions given in 64.7% of completed prosecutions in 1961 and 65.6% of
completed prosecutions in 1965).
100. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 90, at 24.
101. Letter from Professor Richard Seeburger to the author (Sept. 20, 1985) (on file
with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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the study, Pittsburgh law enforcement officials expressed the opinion that Miranda would ultimately benefit law enforcement by
prompting the police to develop more effective investigatory
0 2
techniques.1
Since Professor Caplan obviously is a skilled advocate, his emphasis on the Pittsburgh study is itself significant. If there were
any hard data to support the conclusion that Miranda has had an
adverse impact on law enforcement, critics of Miranda certainly
would have unearthed it by now.l0 3 The strongest evidence that
Professor Caplan can cite, however, is a study that shows a decline
of seventeen percentage points in the confession rate and no decline in the conviction rate. This in itself provides striking confirmation of the widely shared perception that Miranda's effect on
04
law enforcement has been negligible.1
Professor Caplan concludes his discussion of the empirical
data by pointing out that because the studies were conducted
shortly after the Miranda decision, they fail "'to conclusively tell
102. Id.
103. Professor Kamisar's account of the prosecutors' reaction to then Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger's report on the impact of Miranda in his county provides
some indication of law enforcement's eagerness to obtain this type of data:
In the fall of 1966, (after his office had surveyed more than 1,000 post-Miranda cases,
in fully half of which the defendant had made an incriminating statement), Evelle
Younger, one of the nation's most respected prosecutors, reported that Miranda
seemed to have had no appreciable effect on law enforcement in his jurisdiction-indeed that the conviction rate had increased. "Large or small," concluded
Younger, "conscience usually, or at least often, drives a guilty person to confess. If an
individual wants to confess, a warning from a police officer, acting as required by recent
decisions, is not likely to discourage him."
It is interesting to note that, according to a news story covering the 1967 Annual
Convention of the National District Attorneys Association (presumably accurate because reprinted in the association's official journal), "many" of Younger's colleagues
showed "resentment" toward him "for having broken ranks with them on Miranda":
Civil libertarians, defending the Supreme Court in the face of the huge crime increases, have clung to Mr. Younger's assertions and statistics, holding them as
positive proof that the crime problem exists independent of court decisions, and is
fostered by social conditions.
A number of his colleagues buttonholed Mr. Younger here, pleading with him to
review his statistics and reverse his position. But he only shrugged, said he was
sorry, and stated that his most current figures reinforced his beliefs.
Kamisar, THow to Use, Abuse,-And Fight Back With-Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L. REv.
239, 255 (1972).
104. See gqnerally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 285-86 (1985); see
also Israel, Criminal Procedure,the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1383 (1977) ("The police officers with whom I have spoken generally
acknowledge that announcement of the Miranda warnings causes little difficulty if the
warnings requirement is limited to interrogation of arrested persons at the police station or
in similar settings (e.g., a patrol car).").
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us what Miranda would mean if followed in letter and spirit' or
.. . if extended. ' 105 The simple answer to this point is that Professor Caplan is neither arguing against a different implementation of
Miranda nor against its extension. According to his thesis, the decision should be overruled because it strikes an inappropriate accommodation between individual and law enforcement interests.
The Miranda decision as it presently stands, however, seems to
strike an excellent accommodation between those interests. The
criminal suspect is afforded constitutional protection, but the interests of law enforcement are not impaired. Why should Miranda
be overruled? It gives us the best of all possible worlds.
V.

CONCLUSION

My last statement could be challenged by those who feel that
the Miranda warnings do not effectively safeguard the individual's
fifth amendment privilege at the station house. If the empirical
studies indicate that Miranda has made little difference, perhaps
the goal of providing constitutional protections at the station
house has not been realized. If Miranda merely provides the illusion that we can avoid the dilemma arising from our simultaneous
commitments to the fifth amendment privilege and to a system of
law enforcement that relies heavily upon police interrogation, what
is the value of retaining it? Indeed, Professor Schulhofer suggests
that Miranda is inferior to the voluntariness test in one respect
because "[Miranda's] technique for denying this dilemma, for insuring that we can have our cake and eat it, is infinitely less candid
than the due process balancing analysis." 10 6
In my opinion, Miranda does have value as a symbol of our
commitment to maintaining a fair system of criminal procedure
that seeks to implement the protections embodied in the federal
constitution. As Professor Caplan admits, Miranda "contributed to
a climate of greater respect for suspects ... [and] is a gesture of
government's willingness to treat the lowliest antagonist as worthy
of respect and consideration.' 1 7 Thus, Miranda's symbolic value
not only has produced a better atmosphere for people who come in
contact with the police but also may have made a tangible contribution toward curbing abusive police practices. Retaining Miranda
105.
(1980)).
106.
107.

Caplan, supra note 1, at 1466-67 (quoting M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 131
Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 884.
Caplan, supra note 1, at 1470-71.
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symbolizes the Court's approval of the direction in which our system of justice has moved since the time when, in the words of Justice Harlan, the police were allowed to exert "quite significant
pressures" to extract confessions from suspects.10 8
Conversely, overruling Miranda would send a very different
message. In reference to the fourth amendment's prohibition upon
unreasonable searches, Justice Jackson once said, "We must remember that the extent of any privilege ... which we sustain, the
officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the
limit."'10 9 Just as overruling the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule likely would suggest to the police that they no longer must
comply with the fourth amendment, 1 0 overruling Miranda would
convey the message that restraints on police interrogation have
been largely abandoned. Undoubtedly, this decision would change
the relationship between the police and the criminal suspect. In
light of our commitment to maintaining a fair system of criminal
justice, however, it seems doubtful whether this new relationship
would be preferable to the present one.

108. 384 U.S. at 509 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As one "not too distant example," Justice
Harlan cited Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), "in which the suspect was kicked
and threatened after his arrest, questioned a little later for two hours, and isolated from a
lawyer trying to see him; the resulting confession was held admissible." 384 U.S. at 509 n.5
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
110. See generally Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in HistoricalPerspective, 62 JuDICATURE 333 (1979).

